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Abstract 
This paper proposes to consider decision support systems (DSS) under the activity theory and human-
centered design perspectives. We suggest to embed in the decision support system part of the decision 
maker(s) decision schemes and mutual influences in order to transform the DSS artifact into an instrument 
that will allow its users to adapt their own cognitive models of the task. Examples are presented in the 
individual and collective decision processes, explaining the way the users can interact with the system. This 
leads to propose to orient future DSS research towards supporting decision makers themselves, thus 
possibly defining a concept of decision making support system to be in agreement with human-centered 
design main principles. 
Keywords 
Decision support systems, activity theory, cognitive processes and models 
Introduction 
Being related to concepts such as free will, responsibility, knowledge or rationality, decision making is often considered as 
the most “human” of human cognitive processes. But on the other hand, it seems that the major trends in designing decision 
support systems have emphasized the rationality only, and that they did not take into account major characteristics of users as 
human and social beings. Neither was systematically analyzed nor justified the role and the place of the decision support 
system in the global framework of human activity. On the opposite, this paper supports another approach that is based upon 
human-centered design, activity theory and cognitive psychology and that allows to reinforce and to better support the human 
part of decision making process. 
The paper is structured as follows: in a first part, we recall briefly the main principles and features of activity theory and 
human-centered design, that both encourage re-considering the human and machine roles in human activity. In a second part, 
we present some examples of cognitive models for individual and collective decision modeling, and the way these models 
were used to design human-centered decision support systems. In a third and last part, we discuss about these examples from 
the activity theory point of view, and draw future research perspectives in this direction. 
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Human–centered design and activity theory 
Human-centered design 
The questions related to the place of human beings in workplaces and to the objectives and modalities of task automation 
have become more and more challenging as technologies and information processing were spreading all over industrial 
processes, or even personal activities. After decades of systems developments centered and driven by technology, it was 
however stated that thinking about the human operator as a kind of “residual element” within a set of machines could lead to 
errors and great difficulties in controlling the system. These difficulties may be “limited” to the level of performances in 
companies (Landauer 1986), but may also reveal to be extremely dangerous in the case of critical systems (Reason 1990). 
The idea of human-centered design was therefore proposed (Hoffman et al. 2001) as a new way of thinking about systems, 
while taking into account more explicitly human characteristics of users, and re-integrating them into the control chain of the 
system. 
What is human-centered design?  Referring to (Rabardel 1995), human-centered design (or analysis) focuses on the user’s 
point(s) of view on his/her activity, while classical technology-driven approaches only focus on the technical part of it. This 
means that human-centered design has to focus upon the system’s user and to consider him/her as a psychological being, 
provided with motivation, goals, cognition and memory. The user is no longer see as some kind of neutral automata in charge 
of part of the tasking, evaluated in terms of performance only. Human-centered design therefore needs to rely on a better 
understanding of the cognitive processes involved in activities, as well as of the sociological aspects when dealing with group 
activity. But focusing on human cognitive psychology is not enough if the activity is embedded into and supported by a 
technical and organizational framework that cannot be ignored. There is therefore a need for extending the analysis to the 
interactions between cognitive processes and this framework. This is especially the purpose of activity theory that we present 
briefly here below. 
Activity theory, concept of instrument 
Activity theory was proposed by Vygotsky and his colleagues Luria and Leontiev (Vygotsky 1978) at the beginning of 20th 
century as an innovative way of thinking about human work and action. Activity theory is based upon the idea of having the 
action relying on an artifact that mediates subject (the user) and object (the environment). Human action is therefore a three-
fold structure as represented on Figure 1(left). 
Figure 1. Activity theory (initial version: left, extended version from (Engeström 1987): right). 
Instead of focusing on cognitive psychology and on an “isolated” individual, activity theory proposes to focus on activity,
that can be observed in professional and stable frameworks. The subject is a user or a group of users involved in an activity. 
An object (also to be understood as an objective) motivates the subject and orients his/her actions. The mediation, supported 
by the artifact, may involve several kinds of tools, which could be material (in the classical sense of the term) or symbolic 
(such as culture, language or way of thinking). Vygotsky especially studied the way language was first used by children as an 
external mean of communication with adults, and then internalized in order to become a structuring tool for thought 
(Vygotsky 1978, Vygostsky 1981). 
An extension of Vygotsky’s first version of activity theory allowed to take into account the social aspects of activity 
(Leontiev 1981). In this second version (see Figure 1 (right)), the initial triad is extended to task sharing, community and 
rules: task sharing represents the way work is split amongst individuals, and the hierarchical aspects of organization; 
community represents the group of individuals involved in the activity; rules concern norms and regulations within the 
community. 
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Rabardel proposes to refine Vygotsky’s triadic structure in defining instruments instead of simple artifacts. According to his 
point of view, many theories that focused on the artifact as a separated universe by itself (some artificial intelligence 
approaches were and still are in this line) led to forget about the user once more, or at least to set new barriers between the 
three poles of the structures. On the opposite, Rabardel (1995) proposes to define an instrument as a hybrid entity composed 
of an artifact and of the utilization schemes of the user (individual schemes) or group of users (praxis). In oversimplified 
words, the instrument is the association of an (material or symbolic) artifact and of a “part of the user” related to his/her 
know-how and expertise. It seems to us that this approach is especially relevant when one considers the computer as an 
artifact, because the inscription and memorization of the user’s contribution to the instrument is easily supported by symbolic 
data. 
Most of the concepts that were presented here above were however primarily developed for material artifacts, and most often 
for sensori-motor schemes. We propose to extend these notions to decision making, as explained in the following paragraph. 
Decision as an activity 
Considering decision under the activity theory point of view need to make some clarifications.  
First, we have to think about the triadic representation. We shall assume here that even if not explicitly mentioned in the 
analyses, the decision making process is not supposed to be epistemic, and that there is an object to be modified after a 
decision (settings of an industrial process are actually modified according to a control decision, auctions are sold or bought 
after a trading decision, etc.). 
Second, we have to make clear that we focus on decision making as a professional task, in other words that we are concerned 
with decision makers (DM). In decision theories (more generally in cognitively based modeling), several types of decision 
makers are usually considered: naive, novice, expert and professional of decision making (i.e. statistician and/or operation 
researcher…). We shall focus here on experts, whose daily (or weekly) actions take the form of decisions. An expert DM is 
familiar with the tasks he/she has to perform. He/she knows how to structure what a naive subject would consider as 
amorphous. An expert is someone who can make sense out of chaos (Shanteau 1988). All these features make decision 
making fully compatible with the concept of activity. But an expert is also able to convince his/her colleagues as well as 
his/her hierarchy, as all of them agree to acknowledge his/her great experience. The expert level of decision making is 
therefore also compatible with the extended version of activity theory and social considerations. 
Last but not least, there needs to be an artifact. We shall consider that the decision support system plays this role, assuming 
that one unique computer-based system allows simultaneously to effectuate the decision (transform it into an order) and to 
assist the decision maker in his/her decision task (in a way that we shall make more precise in the coming paragraphs).  
In order to follow the line of the definition of a decision support instrument, we have to make explicit “which part of the 
user” to attach to the artifact, and which form this part could take: in other words, we have to define what the concept of 
scheme of action (Richard 1990) becomes when transposed into a decisional domain.  
Cognitive models for individual decision making 
Decision making involves two main types of tasks: choice and judgment. In a choice task, the alternatives are compared, the 
ones to the others, in a judgmental task a label has to be attached to each alternative. A choice task needs, at least, two 
alternatives. Only one suffices to perform a judgmental task. 
A major key point of cognitive approaches of decision modeling is that decision making can be viewed as the outcome of an 
information process (Lindsay and Norman 1980). Several kinds of processes have been studied, such as heuristics (like 
representativity or availability (Kahneman et al. 1982)), articulation of elementary strategies (Svenson 1989, Montgomery 
and Svenson 1976), decision making as problem solving (Huber 1986) and as a search for a dominance structure 
(Montgomery 1986). We shall focus here on a computational model of the latter, namely the Moving Basis Heuristics 
(MBH), proposed by Barthélemy and Mullet (1986) (for more extensive analysis and references, please refer to (Barthélemy 
et al. 2006)). 
Let us suppose that a judgmental decision task attached to an expert consists in selecting or rejecting products that can be 
described along 10 attributes a1 ...a10. For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine as well that each attribute has only 5 possible 
values, 1 being the best valuation, and 5 the worst. Writing aij the attribution of value j to attribute i, a product - dedicated to 
be either selected or rejected - will then be described by a vector of aspects1 such as [a13, a24, ..., a102]. If we suppose the 
attributes scales to be ordinal, the space of products will be equivalent to the direct product of ten ordered dimensions 
 
1 An aspect is to be understood as a couple (attribute, value or interval of values), as defined in most of decision theories. 
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corresponding to each of the attributes dimensions. Following the dominance search and MBH approaches, we assume that 
the expert’s decision will always rely on a limited set of special references (or anchors), defined by limited subsets of aspects. 
These references might be considered as some kind of representations of cognitive prototypes (Rosh and Mervis 1975), used 
by the DM to infer decisions. A major property of these reference sets is therefore that are mutually incomparable (they form 
what is called an antichain in the total space). In other words, the MBH approach assume that (i) a reference only applies 
when a certain dominance condition is respected2, and that (ii) for an expert DM, one and only one reference can apply for a 
given decision task (otherwise, it could lead to indecisive situations, which is uncharacteristic of an expert). From now, we’ll 
call these special reference the dominance structures of the expert DM. 
Thus, in our example, one could imagine that a combination such as a33, a52 (attribute a3 with value 3, and attribute a5 with 
value 2) could allow to decide (i.e. select or reject) for all alternatives that will be at least at these levels for attributes a3 and 
a5, whatever could be the values of the other attributes. SD1={a33, a52} is then one of the dominance structures of the expert 
decision maker. {a24, a43} or {a31, a72, a94} could be other possible dominance structures, but {a34, a52} could not, as it is 
dominated by SD1 on attribute a3.
In analyzing the decisions taken by an expert DM under interactive questioning, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to 
extract his/her set of dominance structures (the minimal set of configurations allowing to “cover” the whole space while 
remaining mutually incomparable, in order to respect the dominance principle), and to know which parts of an alternative to 
be selected are meaningful to the decision maker (Barthélemy et al. 1995). Of course, the complete exploration of the 
combinatorial space is generally not possible: the size of the problem may be too large, or, even if the problem was limited in 
terms of combinatorics, an expert DM would not accept to spend too much time to answer this kind of questions. Efficient 
solutions may be however proposed with some light supplementary hypotheses (Lenca 1995). 
From this model, there is no great difficulties to trace back to the activity theory: the most important part of the decisional 
behavior of an expert decision maker is defined through his/her dominance structures, that can be directly translated into a set 
of production rules3, that is to say decisional schemes. Moreover, in agreement with Rabardel’s point of view (1995), several 
schemes – here several dominance structures – may be associated to a situation depending on the context and on the user’s 
point of view at decision time.  
We recall that one of the most important characteristics we claim to be attached to the dominant structures is that they can be 
extracted from the observation of the decision makers’ behaviors. Therefore we propose to use these accessible data 
structures as the relevant “part of the user” to be integrated into the instrument in the spirit of activity theory, as we 
mentioned previously. This is what was done in the case of industrial process control, in the COMAPS project (Cognitive 
Management of Anthropocentric Production System) that we present in the following section. 
Example of application: cognitive management of industrial process control 
COMAPS project4 aimed at the reinforcement of the role of expert decision makers in the control of complex and flexible 
industrial processes. COMAPS approach was based on the non-intrusive extraction of DM’s decision strategies whose 
support was actually the expert’s dominance structures. In this case, the extraction of decisional schemes was not based upon 
the ordinal structuring of the decision space, but instead on statistical modeling of behaviors (see Figure 2). This modeling 
was still aiming at the dominance effects analysis, as well as at taking into account the cognitive limitations of users’ 
rationality (mining data resulting from history of user’s decisions respected the principle of low number of dimensions that 
were to attach to dominance structures (Lesaux et al. 1999)). 
As the analysis needed to be based upon empirical observations of decision along time, the mining algorithms were not 
supposed – as it is usual in machine learning approaches – to compute decision strategies once from a fixed set of data, but 
they were designed to allow the continuous updating of the dominance structures according to the sequences of user’s 
decisional behaviors (Lesaux 2000). 
 
2 This dominance condition is to be understood in the usual decision theories sense: one alternative is dominant over another 
one if it is not worst on all attributes, and better on at least one. 
3 We recall that decisions are not to be considered as only epistemic, and that we consider here the effect of decision on the 
object to be implicitly embedded in the user’s choices or judgments. 
4 COMAPS research project was funded by the European Commission in the 4th Framework Program (BRITE EURAM III). 
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Figure 2. COMAPS statistical clustering decision observations (dots) into dominance structures (blocks). 
The resulting decision support system was based on the following principles:  
- First, the operator remains in control of the control decision, and the assisting tool only provides some feedback, 
advices and possible extra-information about the control situation and the previously related decision. More 
precisely, based upon a “check-as-you-decide” principle, each control situation is displayed at the operator with a 
color (called “decoration”) indicating its status in the machine. As it can be seen on Figure 3, three different colors 
may be used: if the color is red, the decision to be taken by the operator is inconsistent with the previous cases and 
the related decision strategy. If the color is blue, the case seems not to have been encountered in the past. If the color 
is green, the case is compatible with the current understanding of operator’s strategies. 
- Second, the operator may on demand access to the underlying rules and cases databases that underlie the decoration. 
Figure 4 represents the way decision schemes (i.e. association rules) are represented in a separate window. 
- Third, as the operator remains in control of the final decision to be applied, each of his/her choices is sent back to 
the mining algorithm that updates accordingly the evaluation of dominance structures. 
Figure 3. COMAPS main screen: each line of the upper part of the window corresponds to a control situation to be processed. 
Decisions are displayed in the two yellow columns and the color of each line follows the “check-as-you-decide” code. The lower part 
of the windows point at control situations that are retrieved as close to the current one in the control history. 
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Role of the assistance system in COMAPS 
COMAPS system is dedicated to a better understanding of the expert decision maker’s strategies, but mostly in a reflexive 
way: its main goal can be finally described as providing the operator with external “long-term memory” of his/her own 
strategies, i.e. some kind of extra “food for thought” in order to further improve process understanding and control. 
A second function (called novice mode) is oriented towards group and organization, while authorizing a novice operator to 
control the process while being constrained by (and learning from) the embedded expert decision makers strategies. 
Figure 4. Accessing decision schemes in COMAPS. The lower part of the window displays the current set of production rules 
computed from the history of cases: blue parts of each line indicate the aspects evaluated in the rule, and the corresponding control 
decision is underlined in yellow. The mined dominance structures respect the principle of a low number of aspects. 
COMAPS and activity theory 
COMAPS is a first step towards activity-theory oriented (or human-centered) design of decision support systems: it allows to 
embed, in the artifact, part of the decision maker’s expert schemes, transforming the neutral computer-based control system 
into what was defined to be an instrument. The regular updating of decision schemes from the empirical observations is also 
very close to the evolution if the instrument according to activity theory and Rabardel. Furthermore, the approach is 
supporting the idea of personalizing and individualizing the decision support system itself: while being equipped with one 
particular expert decision maker’s scheme, the system cannot be used indifferently by other decision makers5 and is adapted 
to a given decision style. 
Several functionalities and research points are however still missing. A first one is that the dynamics of evolution of the 
schemes was not studied in depth, and especially the way these decision schemes could aggregate or disappear for new ones. 
If these functions are present in the mining algorithm (in order to guarantee an efficient updating of the model from empirical 
data), there was no analysis conducted at operator’s level on validated decision schemes. A second major point concerns the 
 
5 In expert mode, of course: in the case of the novice mode, on the contrary, the tool is used as a mediator between an 
inexperienced user and the collected expert strategies. 
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evolution of the artifact: according to activity theory, the decision maker should be able to create dedicated commands within 
the artifact in order to make operant the observed strategies so that the evolutions of artifact and user could be joint. At last, 
the artifact was only considered according to individual version of activity theory and did not take into account the 
organizational context. The following example proposes a first answer to this question. 
Cognitive models for collective decision making 
We present briefly here a prospective example dedicated to the collective dimension of decision (for a more detailed 
presentation, see (Coppin et al. 2007)). The second version of activity theory allowed extending the analysis to the norms, the 
community and the division of labor. We especially consider here the community level, and the ways conflicts – that are at 
the origin of activity evolution – could be solved or at least made explicit in order to reach a more appropriate consensus. 
As it was already stated for technology-driven developments and for classical decision support systems at individual level, 
most of classical approaches dealing with expert decisions aggregation and consensus only work on the decision outputs of 
the individual decision makers amongst the team. They generally try to combine and harmonize these individual decision 
outputs into an optimal common strategy, but do not take into account the activity level of decision makers.  
Though these traditional approaches may find very solid formal and mathematical background, they may fall under the same 
critic as classical utility models for individual decision: they are neither taking into account the cognitive processes of 
individual DM, nor the mutual influences amongst these processes (Ruta and Gabrys 2000). As a first step, we would like to 
extend and adapt the cognitive individual models presented in the previous sections to the collective level, while integrating 
the influences and effects that other decision makers – currently working on the same questions and problems – have on 
individual dominance structures. As for the individual case, we suppose decision makers under study to be experts, and to 
share a common set of output alternatives related to the case to be processed, even if their points of view may differ. 
Especially, they may share only a small subset of variables describing the situation, and may even have different 
measurement or interval values for a shared variable, and/or possess distinct fields of expertise. 
At collective level, we propose that the “part of the users” to be described – and further to be used for transforming the 
artifact into an instrument – should include the sets of dominance structures of each individual DM, and a complement of 
description on the mutual influences and inter-individual past conflicts and past congruencies. In terms of information 
processing, this means that when facing a situation of decision, each expert decision maker may be represented by a set of 
candidate dominance structures as represented on Figure 5. 
x x
D1
DS1
Aspects a4 a5a2
Attributes C1 C2 C3 C5
x
C4
x x
x x
x x
DS2
DS3
DS4
D2
Figure 5. Activation of dominance structure for an expert DM. DS1 and DS2 are two dominance structures leading to decision D1,
DS3 and DS4 two other structures leading to D2. Here, from aspects representation of the situation, dominance structures are totally 
or partially “activated”, and lead to decision D2.
From this description and a representation of the network of influences amongst the organization, the mutual influences of 
cognitive processes amongst the team may be described through a reinforcement effect (acting on a dominance structures 
thanks to the attributes validated by other DM) or by abduction (acting on a dominance structures and its attributes when it 
may lead to a conclusion that is related to other DMs’ ones) (see Figure 6). 
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From this kind of modeling, we may better understand the dynamics of conflicts and decision making amongst a team of 
experts. Especially, we expect to understand the inner mechanisms that may lead to phenomena such as extreme consensus or 
active minorities (Moscovici 1986).  
Example of application: assisting consensus amongst a team of experts 
We applied this approach to the field of airborne surveillance, where multiple expert decision makers have to cross their local 
decisions and conclusions about targets identification to reach a consolidated consensus. Simulating the sequence of 
intermediary decisions amongst the team, it was made possible to understand the reason for some preferences reversal along 
time (Coppin et al. 2007). 
x x
D1
DS1
Aspects used by another DM a4 a5
Attributes C1 C2 C3 C5
x
C4
x x
x x
DS2
DS3
DS4
D2
a5
C6 C8C7
x
x x
x x x
–
+
+
+
Abduction  –
Reinforcement  +
Figure 6. Influence of “external” information of the activation of dominance structures. Here, DS1 is weakened while DS2, DS3 and 
DS4 are reinforced, since they are consistent with the aspects representation of another DM. 
Role of the assistance system in collective decision cases 
The roles of the assistance system in the collective case that can be planned from these bases could be among the following 
when dealing with global system performance: 
- Analyzing and making explicit coalitions within the decision teams, and studying their effect upon the consensus; 
- Highlighting dropped or un-explored dimensions of alternatives that have a potential value for decision consensus; 
- Stimulating and filtering the communications between decision makers according to context and requirements (to 
avoid “oscillations” in decisions or to reach a minimal level of coverage and of decision justification). 
Generally speaking, the assisting tool has the capability of memorizing past combinations of individual decisions, and to 
make explicit the inter-relations between decision makers amongst the team. 
Links with activity theory 
At the collective level, activity theory especially emphasizes the notion of conflicts within the team, and the way these 
conflicts may lead to individual schemes and artifact evolution. The approach we propose in this case, even if still 
prospective, aims at answering these questions: identifying and making explicit the origins of conflicts between decision 
makers, as well as highlighting decision makers’ social schemes (such as coalitions or active minorities), which allows the 
inscription in the artifact of part of users psychological motives and behavioral schemes. 
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Conclusion: Rethinking about decision aid approach 
Decision maker(s) support systems 
As a conclusion, let us come back to the notions of human-centered design of information systems and activity theory. 
Decision support systems, considered through the prism of these approaches, will evolve from simple artifacts to instruments. 
Still according to Rabardel (1995) and Vygotsky (1978, 1980), one can even distinguish between material instruments 
(allowing to act directly on the objects), psychological instruments (allowing the decision maker to manage his/her own 
activity) and semiotic instruments (allowing to interact with other decision makers). Structuring decision support systems 
from individual and collective decision schemes allows to address properly this three-fold requirement: (i) extracting and 
mirroring individual dominance structures gives decision makers a way to self-manage their activity, (ii) communicating 
these structures to others allows to address the semiotic level, and (iii) integrating these structures in the artifact allows to 
enhance efficiently the actions upon the objects. Therefore in the line of human-centered approach (Barthélemy et al. 2002) 
we promote the concept of decision maker(s) assistance instead of decision making assistance (Coppin et al. 2007). 
Perspectives 
The first results we got on individual and collective decision support system must of course be consolidated, especially at the 
collective level. It should be also interesting to analyze, in a more longitudinal study, the way the activity generates 
successive stable generations of instrument and know-how. This notion, close to Piaget’s stages of children cognitive 
development, could lead in the case of decision makers to a renewed definition of levels of expertise associated to the levels 
of maturation of the instrument itself. 
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